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Jeres åndssvag-kriminelle 'elite' har opnået at føre Europa til
afgrundens kant, ved årtierlang masseindvandring fra tredjeverden, især
dens muhammedanske del, hvilken i har ansvaret for. Og at dømme efter
det man læser ('også fremover den hidtidige indvandringspolitik'), har
i endnu ikke begrebet jeres fejl - eller i vil ikke begribe den.

Da befolkningen ikke vil sidde og se på, hvordan deres lande bliver
taget fra dem, specielt ved muhammedanere, er der tilsynenladende to
muligheder for jer:

Enten i begynder nu at løse problemet på omfattende måde, på
europæisk/vestlig plan: slut med indvandringen plus repatriering af de
fleste herværende, under brug af alle nødvendige midler, også
militæriske;

eller der kommer indenfor overskuelig fremtid en borgerkrig med mange
døde. *I* vil være blandt ofrene, for jeres 'normale' naboer ved hvor i
bor, og de vil komme og hente jer. *Ingen* vil beskytte jer, i kommer
at dø. Ingen berømmelsesfuld ende af jeres leksikon-artikel.

Ingen dejlige tanker, jeg ved. Det er jo derfor, at i fortsætter med at
fortrænge dem. Og derfor må man konfrontere jer med dem så ofte, til i
ikke finder undflygter mere.

Nå - ville det under disse omstændigheder måske ikke alligevel være
enklere at hævde sig mod 'globaliserings'- osv -fanatikerne hos de
diverse internationale organisationer og heller lave det, som ønskes af
jeres befolkninger ?!?


Aktuel anledning:

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MTU4YzE1MjZhZTlmMjZiZmMzMjQzMGU5NjdjYjJjZjE=&w=MA==


Can uncontrolled immigration kill a continent? According to Walter
Laqueur, it already has. Laqueur, an historian who’s spent a lifetime
moving between America and Europe, is a scholar and public intellectual
of international stature. So its news when the latest book from so
knowledgeable and unimpeachable a friend of Europe echoes and extends
the themes of a pugnacious series of American tracts on European
decline. Whether European intellectuals will be able to dismiss
Laqueur’s The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent, just
as they’ve dismissed so many other such books, is an open question.
(It’s tough to discount a book endorsed by Henry Kissinger and Niall
Ferguson.) What’s certain is that, in the midst of our own immigration
debate, Americans cannot afford to ignore The Last Days of Europe.

Immigration Disaster In combination with Europe’s demographic decline
and guilt-laden multiculturalism, says Laqueur, unchecked immigration
has created a massive and growing population of unassimilated Muslims,
hostile to their own countries and determined to transform Europe
beyond all recognition, through a combination of violent and
non-violent means. “Why had the European countries brought these
[Islamist] attacks upon themselves?” asks Laqueur. “Above all,” he
says, “it was naivete that had made possible the indiscriminate
immigration of earlier decades.” In his concluding reflection on what
went wrong for Europe, Laqueur singles out immigration as first among
causal equals:

“...uncontrolled immigration was not the only reason for the decline of
Europe. But taken together with the continent’s other misfortunes, it
led to a profound crisis; a miracle might be needed to extract Europe
from these predicaments.”

In Laqueur’s telling, the trouble began “when European countries
recruited workers abroad to do the work European workers were not
willing or able to do.” Only about half of the (supposedly temporary)
guest workers who came to Europe during the boom years of the 1960s
returned home as initially planned. “Others stayed on legally or
illegally and in many cases brought relatives to join them, and the
host governments were not willing to enforce the law against those who
broke it.” When Europe’s boom gave out following the OPEC oil shock in
1973, governments stopped issuing work visas. But that didn’t stop
immigration. Relatives flowed in legally, through family reunification
laws, and illegally, as immigrant smuggling became a major business.

There followed a flood of asylum seekers, to whom the authorities were
“quite liberal in their approach, even though the majority of these
immigrants, probably the great majority, were not political refugees
but ‘economic migrants.’” Many were Islamists, others hoped to
establish criminal gangs, “but all asylum seekers, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, were supported by a powerful lobby, the human rights
associations and churches that provided legal and other aid. They
claimed it was scandalous and in violation of elementary human rights
to turn back new immigrants and that in case of doubt mercy should
prevail.”

As supposed asylum seekers poured in, they destroyed their papers,
making it impossible for European authorities to deport them. What’s
more, “border controls inside Europe were largely abolished and if an
immigrant had put foot into one European country he could move freely
to another.” Laqueur adds that the “number of asylum seekers, real and
bogus, began to decline after 2002, following the introduction of more
stringent screening measures.” But by then it was too late; Europe had
entered its “last days.”

It should have been clear early on that immigration was creating
serious problems, says Laqueur.

Muslim resistance to assimilation was evident, as were the warning
signs of demographic decline. And had it been clear, it is hardly the
case that nothing could have been done about it. After all, says
Laqueur, “illegal immigrants to Japan or China, Singapore, or virtually
any other country would have been sent back within days, if not hours,
to their countries of origin.” Yet, because all this was ignored, says
Laqueur, we now face “the end of Europe as a major player in world
affairs.” Almost overnight, Laqueur continues, “what had been
considered a minor problem on a local level is becoming a major
political issue, for there is growing resistance on the part of the
native [European] population, who resent becoming strangers in their
own homelands. Perhaps they are wrong to react in this way, but they
have not been aware until recently of this trend, and no one ever asked
or consulted them.”

What Were They Thinking?

Laqueur returns several times to the failure of Europe’s authorities to
consult with the public on immigration. Instead of putting the matter
up for debate, government and corporations quietly and unilaterally set
policy. Europe’s elite had a bad conscience, given memories of refugees
from Nazi Germany who’d been turned away decades earlier. There was
also the omnipresent “fear of being accused of racism.” This bizarre
combination of multiculturalism and complete disregard for the
significance of culture opened up a huge gulf between Europe’s elite
and the public “a gulf that emerged openly when France and The
Netherlands rejected the proposed EU constitution (in part over
concerns about Muslim immigration and the accession of Turkey to the
EU). There was, says Laqueur, “a backlash against the elites who wanted
to impose their policies on a population who had not been
consulted....Another important motive was the reluctance to hand over
national sovereignty to central, remote and anonymous institutions over
which people had no control.”

Laqueur concludes that it’s next to impossible for an historian to
establish just what it was that Europe’s authorities were thinking when
they formulated the immigration practices now undermining Western
civilization in its very cradle. To the question “Did they imagine that
uncontrolled immigration would not involve major problems?” Laqueur
responds that it is unanswerable. (My guess is that, like today’s
market-based immigration advocates in America, European leaders were
focused on the immediate need for labor and gave little if any thought
to long-term social consequences. In other words, the simplest
explanation for Laqueur’s inability to track down the deep thoughts of
Europe’s leaders about the cultural consequences of immigration is that
there never were any such thoughts.)

But why should mass immigration have been a problem for Europe when the
need for labor was (and is) real, and when modern dynamos like America
and Australia were virtually built on mass immigration? Part of the
answer lies in Europe’s relative lack of experience with immigration
and assimilation. Yet there’s more at work, as Laqueur shows, through a
comparison of post-WWII Muslim immigration with the wave of Jewish
migration to both Western Europe and the United States at the beginning
of the twentieth century.

Culture Counts

Jews entered Western Europe in that period by the tens of thousands,
not by the millions. They also made great efforts to integrate, above
all seeking a good secular education for their children, at almost any
price. There was no welfare state in those days — no social workers, no
subsidized housing, no free medical payments, and no social security.
Back then, it was sink or swim, whereas the modern welfare state has
removed the incentives for success that used to force cultural
integration. When they first arrived in Britain, Laqueur tells us, many
Bangladeshis were reluctant to accept government assistance, viewing
welfare payments as dishonorable and contrary to Islam. It was only the
advice of social workers that managed to turn welfare dependence into a
way of life for these Bangladeshi migrants.

That doesn’t mean Laqueur discounts the influence of Muslim culture on
failed integration — far from it. The Last Days of Europe is being
touted for its measured tone, in contrast to, say, the blistering (and
blisteringly funny and effective) polemics of Mark Steyn’s America
Alone. That’s an accurate assessment, up to a point. If there was even
a single joke in The Last Days of Europe, I missed it. Yet Laqueur has
no tolerance whatever for political correctness, and doesn’t mince
words. For example, Laqueur’s extended critique of “Islamophobia” as an
explanation for failed Muslim assimilation in Europe is devastating.
Laqueur doesn’t hesitate to say that the fundamental problem of Muslim
assimilation is cultural — rooted in traditional Islam, and in the
strange blend of Muslim mores and ghetto street-culture that nowadays
shapes Europe’s angry young Muslim men.

Far from distancing himself from conservative critiques of Europe,
Laqueur embraces them, invoking conservative writers like Theodore
Dalrymple and The Weekly Standard’s Gerard Alexander. Laqueur even
argues that the term “barbarian” can be applied with justice to the
actions of some lawless young Muslim men. He also takes seriously the
possibility of a violent Muslim revolution in Europe. Laqueur’s tone
may be calm, but his substance is explosive — and very much of a piece
with the long train of “conservative” books on European decline.

The Last Days of Europe is a book about culture. Laqueur rejects the
cultural blindness of economic elites who see immigration in strictly
market terms. He rejects racism and xenophobia as explanations of
failed Muslim integration, in favor of a cultural account. He rejects
economic explanations for the decline of Europe itself, insisting
instead that the erosion of strong families, relativism, and a loss of
faith in the future are at the root of Europe’s problems. (Laqueur
unashamedly invokes Gibbon here.)

Delusions

Laqueur is convinced that Europeans (and their liberal American
admirers) have been living in a state of “delusion.” He is ruthless in
skewering a series of recent American books touting Europe as the
world’s emerging “soft superpower,” a continent destined to lead the
world through its exemplary combination of benevolence and justice. The
notion that the hard-eyed powers of the world will — on the basis of
sheer inspiration — come to emulate European rule of law comes in for
polite ridicule by Laqueur. The Last Days of Europe’s fascinating
chapter on Russia is a case study in failed expectations for democratic
and market universalism, and therefore also a study in the
recalcitrance of culture.

Europe’s disastrous and deluded decline is so obvious to Laqueur that
he expends considerable energy wondering out loud how anyone could ever
have taken the world-wide triumph of European “soft power” seriously to
begin with. Reading Laqueur, it’s tough not to notice parallels between
the leftist fantasy of a pacifist, rule-bound world and the Bush
administration’s own overconfidence in the power of exemplary
democracy. The Bush administration’s willingness to use military force
is generally contrasted with the European (and American) Left’s
abhorrence of force and preference for soft power. Yet the two
positions are less at odds than meets the eye.

True, the president’s strategy required that military force be used to
implant democracy in the heart of the Muslim world. Yet the plan was to
avoid the need for a heavy military “footprint” in Iraq, or for
military actions against other powers, by allowing democracy’s
allegedly universal appeal to spread spontaneously through both Iraq
and the region. The Western Left adheres to an only slightly different
fantasy of democratic contagion. If the Bush administration unwisely
depended on the domino effect of elections in Iraq, the fantasy of a
“soft superpower” depends on the supposed domino effect of policies
like the abolition of capital punishment and rule by the International
Criminal Court.

Like many others, Laqueur roots Europe’s fall in its relativism,
multiculturalism and — to speak more bluntly — Europe’s simple lack of
confidence in its own values. Yet Laqueur’s account could be read to
make the opposite point. Underneath all that guilt and cultural
deference lies overweening and unwarranted self-confidence. Europe’s
delusional belief in its ability to lead the world without force —
through exemplary justice alone — rests on a profoundly “ethnocentric”
conviction of its own moral superiority.

This same self-confidence helps explain why Europe’s elites discounted
the cultural challenge of immigration. Insofar as they bothered to
consider the issue, the unthought-out assumption was that liberal
modernism’s superiority would be seen, acknowledged, and therefore
eventually adopted by Muslim immigrants. So it turns out the Europe’s
old ethnocentric “social evolutionism” — the notion that the world’s
“barbarian nations” would sooner or later adopt the West’s superior
ways — has never really disappeared. Nowadays, however, instead of
inspiring sacrifice and justifying imperial force, the social
evolutionism obviates the need for either; it’s an ideology of
superiority, without cost or hard work — cultural superiority as pure
wish-fulfillment.

The West would do better to have confidence in its own values, while
also recognizing that our values are our own — and are therefore
unlikely to be spontaneously adopted by others. It is a characteristic
weakness of liberal democracy to assume its own universal appeal, while
taking democracy’s cultural pre-requisites for granted. Precisely
because the West now imports populations who lack the cultural
pre-requisites for democracy and market capitalism, the immigration
issue has the power to explode democracy’s characteristic cultural
naïveté (if it doesn’t explode democracy itself first).

America’s Debate

Even as Europe’s immigration-wrought crisis grows, America is facing
its own immigration debate. The parallels to Laqueur’s European story
are obvious: jobs Europeans won’t do, uncontrolled legal and illegal
migration, failure to enforce the law — especially after the initial
crossing at the border — the abuse of family reunification provisions,
melodramas of outrage by human rights groups, bogus but paralyzing
accusations of racism and xenophobia, and sheer obliviousness on the
part of business and government elites about the long-term social and
cultural implications of uncontrolled immigration. Even the European
public’s outrage at being cut out of immigration decision-making has
its American parallel in the attempt to railroad through a gigantic
immigration bill in just days, with virtually no debate — and the
public outrage that’s followed.

But what about differences between the American and European
experiences with immigration? American immigration is largely Hispanic.
If culture is important, then surely Mexican immigrants should be
judged culturally closer to Americans than Muslims are to Europeans.
True enough, but this is far too simple a response.

For starters, Muslim immigration is a non-trivial issue even in
America, as the terror plots at Fort Dix and JFK Airport show. (See
“Look to Europe.”) For another thing, Mexican immigrants in the United
States are reproducing some of the problems of Muslim immigrants in
Europe. Chain migration through family reunification can transport
entire extended families — even whole villages — from Mexico to the
United States, and that creates serious barriers to assimilation (see
“Chain, Chain, Chain”). The problems of Mexican immigrant families in
America are very different from the problems of extended immigrant
Muslim clans in Europe, yet in many ways they are equally severe, as
Heather MacDonald shows in her remarkable article, “Hispanic Family
Values?”

Nightmare

In focusing on immigration, I’ve given short-shrift to the bold,
subtle, hopeful, piercing, and absolutely terrifying dissection of
Europe’s prospects at the conclusion of Laqueur’s book. The Last Days
of Europe’s chilling climax is not to be missed. But the terrifying
fate of Europe is precisely what we need to avoid. While America may
not yet be in Europe’s dire straights, it would be sheer madness to for
the United States to repeat Europe’s deadly immigration mistakes — at
the very moment when the depth of the continent’s tragic errors are
emerging into the light of day.







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No third-world immigration to the western world! Many danes think the
same, see e g

http://www.dendanskeforening.dk/index.asp?id=27 .

Don't surrender, keep on fighting !!!